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LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
The caption of this Appeal contains the list of all parties to the action in the 
proceeding below before the Utah State Insurance Commissioner. The only parties to this 
Appeal, however, are Mr. Ronald G. Black, petitioner, and the complainant, the Utah State 
Insurance Department, as respondent. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. This is an appeal of a determination by an administrative agency 
in a formal adjudicative proceeding. Petitioner Ronald G. Black has sought agency 
review of the determination pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 and has exhausted 
all of his administrative remedies pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Insurance Commissioner erred in failing to set aside the 
Default and Default Judgment against Mr. Black when the evidence showed that because 
of circumstances beyond his control he was completely unaware of the proceeding against 
him, thus excusing his failure to respond to the complaint? (R. at 34-36; 43-49.) 
2. Whether the Petitioner, Mr. Black, was substantially prejudiced by the 
Insurance Commissioner's determinations because they are based on findings of fact that 
are contrary to the evidence and on conclusions and applications of law that are 
erroneous? (R. at 64-67; 71, 78.) 
3. Whether, under Rule 60(b)(1), the Insurance Commissioner improperly 
imputed to Mr. Black the alleged actions of an attorney when it is not clear from the 
record that the attorney was retained to represent Mr. Black, personally, in the context of 
the proceeding, and where the record is clear that Mr. Black had no fault regarding the 
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tailuie to lespond to the complaint filed by the Utah State Insurance Department9 
(R at 64-67, 114-119) 
4. Whether the Insuiance Commissioner erred by not considering w4other 
tactois justifying lehef' trom the operation of the Default and Default Judgment where 
the lecoid shows that the lack ot paiticipation by Mr Black was not due to neglect, but to 
complete lack ot awaieness of the pioceeding9 (R at 64-67, 114-119 ) 
1 he standard by which this Court must review an agency determination is 
established in Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-16(4) l This Court may grant relief if the 
'Subsection (4) oi Section 63-46b-16 piovides 
(4) The appellate couit shall giant lehet only if, on the basis of the 
agency s lecoid it deteimines that a peison seeking judicial leview has been 
substantiall) piejudiced b\ any ot the following 
(a) the agency action, oi the statute oi mle on which the agency 
action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied, 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction confeired by 
any statute, 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues lequinng 
icsolution, 
(d) the agency has enoneously inteipieted oi applied the law, 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful piocedme oi 
decision-making piocess, oi has failed to follow prescribed piocedure, 
(f) the pei sons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body oi were subject to disqualification, 
(g) the agency action is based upon a deteimmation of fact, 
made oi implied by the agency, that is not suppoited by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court, 
(h) the agency action is 
(I) an abuse of the discietion delegated to the agency 
b\ statute, 
(n) contiai\ to a mle ot the agency, 
(in) contiai} to the agency's pnoi practice, unless the 
agenc> justifies the inconsistency b> giving tacts and leasons that 
demonstiate a tan and lational basis foi the inconsistency, oi 
(IV) otherwise arbitrary or capricious 
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petitioner has been "substantially prejudiced" by the agency's action because the 
petitioner was not granted a full and fair hearing. Commercial Carriers v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 888 P.2d 707 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied. 889 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
In reviewing whether the petitioner was prejudiced by incorrect factual determinations, 
the Court may reverse the agency if it determines that "agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." The Court reviews the 
agency's legal conclusions on a "correction of error" standard, granting no deference to the 
agency*s application of the law. Savage Ind., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664 
(Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13 
Utah Code Ann. §'63-46b-14 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 
Rule 60(b). Utah R. Civ. P. (1998). 
Copies of these provisions are set forth in Addendum "A". 
• o -
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves the appeal of adverse rulings from a Utah administrative 
agency, the Utah State Insurance Commissioner. Specifically, the Petitioner, Ronald S. 
Black ("Mr. Black") seeks review of determinations by the Utah State Insurance 
Commissioner to deny his motion under Rule 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P., to set aside default 
and default judgment entered against him. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The Utah State Insurance Department commenced a formal adjudicative 
proceeding against Mr. Black, his estranged wife, Kathi, and their company, Black's 
Title, Inc., by filing a Complaint with the Utah State Insurance Commissioner and by 
mailing a copy of the Complaint and a Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceeding and 
Prehearing Conference on or about October 9, 1997. Approximately thirty-three days 
later, on or about November 12, 1997, the Utah Insurance Department sought, and the 
Insurance Commissioner entered, Default and Default Judgment against Mr. Black, Kathi 
Black, and Black's Title, revoking their insurance licenses. Mr. Black and the others 
timeh filed a motion under Rule 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P., to set aside the Default and 
Default Judgment. On or about April 16, 1998, the Insurance Commissioner denied their 
motion. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13, Mr. Black and the others timely 
requested agency review of the Order denying their motion. By its Order on Review, 
-4-
dated July 20, 1998, the Insurance Commissioner refused to grant Mr. Black's motion to 
set aside the Default or Default Judgment. Copies of the Insurance Commissioner's 
Orders arc attached hereto in Addendum ~B'\ 
C. Statement of Facts. 
During the last half of 1997 and for some time before, Mr. Black was under a 
doctor's care and was unable to work at Black's Title, Inc. ("Black's Title"), a title 
insurance agency and corporation of which Mr. Black is an officer. (R. at 3, 35.) Mr. 
Black continues under a doctor's care and was unable to work at all times relevant to the 
present action. (R. at 35.) 
During the time Mr. Black was unable to work at Black's Title, the company was 
managed solely by his wife, Kathi Black. (R. at 35.) During the last half of 1997, Mr. 
Black came to the business office of Black's Title at 110 West Center Street, Bountiful, 
Utah, only on a few occasions and then only for a few minutes each. (R. at 35.) 
Sometime during the fall of 1997, Mr. Black was informed by Kathi Black that an 
investigator for the Utah State Insurance Department (the "Insurance Department") had 
raised certain issues regarding Black's Title, and that she was working to resolve them. 
(R. at 35.) Mr. Black understood at the time Kathi Black disclosed this information that 
Kathi Black retained the services of attorney George S. Diumenti II ("Mr. Diumenti") to 
assist Black's Title in dealing with the issues raised by the investigator for the Insurance 
Department. (R. at 35.) Mr. Black met with Mr. Diumenti to discuss completely separate 
o-
issues regarding a possible sale of Black's Title to another title insurance company. 
(R. at 35.) 
On or about October 8, 1998, the Insurance Department commenced a formal 
adjudicative proceeding (the "Proceeding") against Mr. Black, Kathi Black, and Black's 
Title by filing a Complaint (the "Complaint") with the Utah State Insurance 
Commissioner (the "Commission"). (R. at 1, 3.) The Insurance Department claims to 
have mailed the Complaint, together with a Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceeding 
and Prehearing Conference (the "Notice") to Mr. Black, Kathi Black, and Black's Title on 
October 9, 1997. The mailing certificate reflects mailing to all three parties at the 
business address of Black's Title. (R. at 7.) In addition to setting a hearing in December 
1997, the Notice states that the parties had thirty days from "the mailing of date of [the] 
Notice" [sic] in which to respond to the Complaint." (R. at 1.) No responses were filed. 
Thirty days ran on Saturday, November 8, 1997. On the thirty-fourth day—Wednesday, 
November 12, 1997—the Insurance Department obtained from the Commission the entry 
of Default and Default Judgment against Mr. Black and the others. (R. at 9.) 
The Insurance Department also purports to have mailed a copy of the Complaint 
and Notice on October 9, 1997, to Mr. Diumenti, as well as to Mr. Black at "675 North 
800 West, West Bountiful...." (R. at 8.) 
Mr. Black never saw the Complaint or the Notice prior to the entry of Default and 
Default Judgment. Mr. Black was completely unaware of the Proceeding against him or 
of any requirement on his part to respond to the Proceeding. (R. at 36.) The Insurance 
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Department purports to have mailed a copy of the Complaint and the Notice to Mr. Black 
and the other parties on October 9, 1997, at the business address or post office box of 
Black's Title, 110 West Center Street, P.O. Box 219, Bountiful, Utah 84011-0219. 
(R. at 7.) Mr. Black, however, never received copies of those documents. (R. at 36.) 
Mail addressed to him at Black's Title or at his home was not being delivered to him by 
the staff at Black's Title, by Kathi Black, or by any other person during the time period 
that he was physically and mentally unable to work. (R. at 36.) Further, neither Kathi 
Black nor Mr. Diumenti nor any other person at Black's Title ever provided Mr. Black 
with notification of the Complaint or Notice, or of any obligation on his part to respond to 
the Proceeding. (R. at 36.) 
On February 11, 1998—within three months after entry of the Default and Default 
Judgment—Mr. Black and the others filed with the Commission a Motion to Set Aside 
Default and Default Judgment (the "Motion"). (R. at 15.) Subsequently, Mr. Black 
obtained the undersigned as separate counsel, and on February 27, 1998, Mr. Black, filed 
a Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of that Motion. 
Mr. Black also filed his own Affidavit in support of the Motion. (R. at 34, 38.) 
Mr. Black's Affidavit, together with the Affidavit of Kathi Black, constitute the only 
''evidence" presented in the entire Proceeding. 
On April 16, 1998, the Commission, by John E. "Mickey" Braun, Jr., entered its 
Order to Deny Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment (the "First Order"). 
(R. at 64-67.) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §63-46b-13, Mr. Black and the others filed 
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Requests for Agency Review, then Amended Requests for Agency Review. (R. at 68, 71, 
75, and 78.) On July 20, 1998, the Commission, by Neal T. Gooch, entered its Order on 
Review (the "Order on Review"), declining to review the First Order and denying, again, 
the Motion. (R. at 1 14.) 
Mr. Black has brought the present Appeal to seek review of the Order on Review, 
the First Order, and, ultimately, to have this Court vacate the Default and Default 
Judgment. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The law abhors a default, and courts should generally be liberal in reversing such 
defaults to allow cases to be decided on the merits. In this case, the Orders from the 
Commission are based on unsupported findings of fact and erroneous conclusions of law 
as to Mr. Black's Motion under Rule 60(b)(1). Accordingly, the Orders substantially 
prejudice Mr. Black, and he is entitled to reversal from this Court. 
further, Mr. Black's failure to respond to the Complaint was arguably not neglect 
at all-excusable or otherwise—because he was simply unaware of the pendency of the 
proceeding. As such, other reasons exist justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6), including, 
(1) the Insurance Department sought the Default and Default Judgment only two business 
dciys after Mr. Black's deadline to respond to the Complaint, without giving notice of its 
intent to do so; (2) new evidence has surfaced since the filing of the Motion that would 
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affect the Department's claims; and (3) the Default and Default Judgment violate Mr. 
Black's due process rights. 
ARGUMENT 
"[D]efault judgment is an unusually harsh sanction that should be meted out with 
caution." Darrington v. Wade. 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Judgments by 
default are generally "disfavored by the law," and whenever possible, cases should be 
decided on the merits. Wright v. Wright. 941 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); 
see also Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962). 
This is a case that deserves to be decided on the merits. This is a case wherein 
Mr. Black should be entitled to meet the Insurance Department's claims head-on before 
the Commission, with evidence and appropriate, meritorious defenses. Instead, in this 
case, the Commission entered Default and Default Judgment against Mr. Black, deprived 
him of his insurance license and livelihood without a hearing, then failed to grant 
Mr. Black's Motion under Rule 60(b) to set that judgment aside once it was discovered. 
The Utah Supreme Court has granted courts broad discretion to set aside entry of default 
and default judgments and, in an effort to preserve traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice, has explained that "courts generally tend to favor granting relief from 
default judgments where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial 
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party." See Westinghouse Elec. Sup. Co. v. Paul W. 
Larson Contractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) (emphasis added); see also Board of 
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Education v. Cox. 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963). Mr. Black has presented ample evidence 
of excusable neglect and "other reasons" justifying relief from the Default Judgment, but 
the Commission made findings and conclusions contrary to that evidence and refused to 
set aside the Default and Default Judgment. 
Mr. Black also satisfied the other requirements of relief under Rule 60(b) by filing 
the Motion in a timely fashion and by presenting meritorious defenses. As the following 
sections will demonstrate, the Commission erred by failing to grant the Motion. This 
Court should therefore reverse the Commission and vacate the Default and Default 
Judgment. 
I. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING MR. BLACK'S MOTION 
BECAUSE ITS FINDINGS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IT INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE 
LAW: MR. BLACK HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED 
THEREBY. 
In reviewing a decision by an administrative agency, such as the Commission, the 
reviewing court is entitled to reverse that decision and grant relief to the petitioner if it 
determines that the petitioner has been "substantially prejudiced" by an agency action 
where: 
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law; . . . 
(g) The agency action is based upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court; 
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Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-16(4) (1998). This Court has previously held that 
"substantial prejudice" is not a question of whether or not the petitioner received an 
unfavorable result, but whether the petitioner was given ua full and fair consideration of 
all of the issues." Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission. 888 P.2d 707 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied. 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). Further, this Court has 
also held that in reviewing the "whole record," the reviewing court must consider both the 
evidence supporting the agency's findings of fact, as well as the evidence that "fairly 
detracts from the weight of the agency's evidence." Grace Drilling v. Board of Review. 
776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In the present case, Mr. Black has been substantially prejudiced by the 
Commission's Orders because he was not given full and fair consideration of the issues. 
The Commission made and implied findings regarding Mr. Black's knowledge and 
awareness regarding the Proceeding and his supposed awareness of a duty and obligation 
to respond to the Commission's Complaint. As will be set forth below, the Commission's 
findings and rationale are completely unsupported by the record. 
Further, the Commission misinterpreted and misapplied the law regarding the 
nature of the relationship between of Mr. Diumenti and Mr. Black when (1) Mr. Black 
bore no fault, and (2) it was not clear from the record whether any attorney-client 
relationship or agency relationship even existed at the time. The Commission further 
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misinterpreted the law by not considering "other reasons" for setting aside the Default 
and Default Judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P.2 
In order to satisfy this standard of review, the burden is placed on Mr. Black to 
marshall all of the evidence in support of the Commission's findings and demonstrate that 
"despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. The 
Commission entered Default and Default Judgment against Mr. Black without reviewing 
any evidence on the merits, which is part of the difficulty with this case. The only 
evidence presented in the entire proceeding are the facts set forth in Mr. Black's affidavit 
in support of his Motion, which facts are set forth in this brief in the "Statement of Facts." 
The following sections of this brief will demonstrate that in light of those facts (or the 
"marshalled" evidence) the Commission's findings are unsupported and its legal 
conclusions are erroneous. 
A. The Commission Erred Because It Based Its Determination On The 
Erroneous Finding That Mr. Black Was Aware Of The Proceeding Against 
Him And His Supposed Obligation To Respond To The Complaint, When 
That Finding Is Not Supported By Any Evidence In The Record. 
In both of its Orders, the Commission erroneously found that Mr. Black was aware 
of the Proceeding and was aware of his duty to defend himself. As support for those 
findings, the Commission also reasoned that Mr. Black did not present any evidence that 
2Rule 60(b) was amended in 1998. What is now subsection (6) was previously numbered 
as subjection (7). 
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his illness was so incapacitating as to render him unable to keep apprised of the 
Proceedings; that Mr. Black had a knowledge of the issues but did nothing to resolve 
them; and that his mail was not "withheld" in spite of requests. Based on these findings 
and rationale, the Commission determined that Mr. Black was negligent in not responding 
to the Complaint and that such purported negligence was not "excusable" under Rule 
60(b)(1). These findings and conclusions, however, are incorrect and unsupported. 
The evidence presented by Mr. Black—and the only relevant evidence presented in 
the Proceeding regarding this issue-clearly shows that Mr. Black was not aware of the 
Proceeding. While the Insurance Department may claim it mailed a copy of the 
Complaint and Notice, Mr. Black never actually received a copy of the Complaint or the 
Notice. Further, he never had notice of his obligation to respond and appear, nor did he 
ever have actual notice of the pendency of the Proceeding until after the Default and 
Default Judgment were entered. As set forth in his affidavit, Mr. Black had limited 
contact with the office of Black's Title during the latter half of 1997, through the time of 
the Proceeding. Because of health problems, he was not in the office regularly. Mail 
addressed to him—either at the office or at home—was not being delivered to him by either 
the staff of Black's Title or by Kathi Black. Again, because of his health concerns, he 
was insulated from any communication regarding Black's Title and from the issues 
involved in the Complaint. As a direct consequence, Mr. Black never received formal, 
actual notice of this matter until after the Default Judgment was entered. 
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The Commission reasons that because Mr. Black does not state that his mail was 
"withheld in spite of requests" and that he does not give specific evidence of his medical 
condition, thai the failure to respond to the Complaint is somehow not excusable. This 
position by the Commission is an unreasonable use of semantics. Whether Mr. Black 
used the word "withheld" or simply states that it was not given to him, the result is the 
same: he never saw his mail. Thus, he never saw the Complaint or the notice. Further, 
he simply gives his testimony, which is not refuted by any contradictory evidence from 
the Commission, that his medical condition was such that he was unable to attend to his 
duties at Black's Title. The specifics of that illness are irrelevant. The evidence is, 
indeed, that his condition was incapacitating enough as to render him incapable of 
responding to the Proceeding. This only highlights the difficulty with allowing the 
Default and Default Judgment to stand: Mr. Black has a great deal of more specific 
evidence regarding his medical condition and his involvement (or lack thereof) with 
Black's Title during the relevant time period. He has not, however, been given an 
opportunity to present that evidence because the Commission simply deprived him of his 
insurance license by the Default and Default Judgment. That specific evidence is lengthy 
and extensive, and was not appropriate for the affidavit in support of the Motion. 
Mr. Black simply requests that this Court reverse the Commissions' determinations, set 
aside the Default and Default Judgment and allow him an opportunity to present that 
evidence in a full and fair hearing. Mr. Black is not seeking to have the Commission's 
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claims dismissed at this juncture; he is seeking only an opportunity to meet those claims 
on the merits. 
In order to qualify as "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1), Utah R. Civ. P., the 
party must show that he has used due diligence and was prevented from acting by 
circumstances over which he had no control. Airkem lntermountain. Inc. v. Parker. 
513 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973). Because Mr. Black was truly unaware of the pendency of 
the Proceeding, the failure to respond to the Complaint was due to circumstances over 
which he had no control. Further, the duty of due diligence cannot be imposed on him 
when he was unaware of the Proceeding. Therefore, it was error for the Commission to 
deny Mr. Black's Motion on this basis. 
B. The Commission Erred By Erroneously Interpreting The Law And 
Imputing Mr. Diumenti's Actions To Mr. Black 
In reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation or construction of the law, 
this Court should apply a "correction of error" standard of review and accord no 
deference to the agency's interpretation. Savage Industries v. State Tax Comm'm 
811 P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991). In the present case, in addition to the fact that the 
Commission's findings are not based on any evidence, it also incorrectly interprets and 
applies the law with regard to reputing Mr. Diumenti's conduct to Mr. Black. 
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1. Attorney Neglect is only Imputed to the Client When the 
Client is also at Fault. 
The Commission concludes, erroneously, that because Mr. Diumenti was 
supposedly aware of the proceeding that somehow Mr. Black should have been aware as 
well and that the burden of failing to respond to the Complaint must be borne by 
Mr. Black. The Commission cites the generally correct principle that an attorney's 
neglect may be imputed to the client. In support of that proposition, the Commission 
relies upon three seminal cases: Airkem International Inc. v. Parker. 513 P.2d 429 
(Utah 1973); Gardiner v. Swapp. 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982); and Walker v. Carlson. 
740 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). While that legal principle may generally be true, it 
is not true in this case, and a careful reading of the seminal cases relied upon by the 
Commission reveals that their holding and rationale are not applicable here. 
One of the central cases on this issue is Airkem International. There, default 
judgment was entered against the defendant in a contract action because neither the 
defendant nor his counsel appeared in court on the day of trial. Significantly, the 
defendant was aware of the lawsuit and filed an answer. Subsequently, the defendant's 
attorney informed him that trial would probably be set in the fall of that year. The court 
then notified counsel for both parties of the trial date. 
In his subsequent motion to set aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b), the 
defendant explained, in an affidavit, that his work schedule made him difficult to contact. 
The court, however, determined that since the defendant knew of the action and was 
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informed that it would probably be set for trial in the fall, his failure to contact his counsel 
himself was inexcusable neglect. The defendant's counsel also failed to exercise due 
diligence, but in the final analysis, it was the fact that the defendant was also personally at 
fault that persuaded the Utah Supreme Court to affirm the trial court's denial of the 
motion to set aside the default judgment. 
Similarly, in Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), 
the Supreme Court issued a similar holding. There, default judgment was entered against 
the defendant for failure to respond to discovery requests. Prior to default, the defendant 
had been served with the complaint and had filed an answer and counterclaim. In his 
untimel) motion to set aside the default and default judgment, defendant stated in his 
affidavit that his attorney never communicated with him concerning the discovery process 
nor informed him of the receipt of interrogatories. 
In refusing to reverse the trial court's denial of the motion, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the lack of communication may not have been solely the fault of the 
attorney. Swapp knew of the litigation and failed to contact his attorney for a year and a 
half after he filed his counterclaim. Further, the defendant knew of the judgment in time 
to move timely under Rule 60(b)(1), but he failed to do so. Thus, even though the 
attorne) was negligent in failing to respond to the discovery requests, the Supreme Court 
makes it clear that such negligence will be imputed only if the client is also negligent. 
Finally, in Walker v. Carlson. 740 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1987), the Supreme Court, 
relying on Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp. saddled the defendant with the 
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burden of his counsel's failure to respond to discovery requests. While the Supreme 
Court relied on the principles of agency in making this conclusion, it also reasoned that 
the defendant himself was aware of the pendency of the action and that a "reasonable 
person" would have begun preparing and gathering evidence in anticipation of trial. 
Thus, again, the Supreme Court only imputed the attorney's negligence when it was 
satisfied that the defendant himself was aware of the proceeding and failed to act as a 
"reasonable person" would. 
In contrast, the case presently before the Court bears no similarity to these three 
cases. In Airkeiru Gardiner, and Walker, all three defendants were served with a 
complaint, were aware of the litigation, had hired their attorneys to represent them, and 
had made some response in the litigation; but ultimately both they and their attorneys 
failed to follow through on some significant aspect of the case. In the present case, 
Mr. Black was never personally served with the Complaint, never had any idea of the 
Proceeding, never made any response or appearance in the Proceeding, and never hired an 
attorney to represent him specifically in the Proceeding. 
Second, in all three cases, the defendants had some communication with their 
counsel specifically regarding the litigation, but at some point that communication broke 
down through the fault of both counsel and the defendants. In the present case, while 
Mr. Black had some contact with Mr. Diumenti regarding completely separate issues, the 
record is clear that they never spoke concerning the Proceeding because Mr. Black didn't 
know about the Proceeding. 
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Third, in all three cases, the court makes it clear that defendants are only liable 
when they breach their duty to act. Specifically, in Walker, the court imposed a 
"reasonable person" standard on defendants. Specifically, defendants are under a duty to 
respond and act in the litigation as would a reasonable person under those circumstances. 
In the present case, then, the only duty that can be imposed upon Mr. Black is the duty of 
what the reasonable person would do who had absolutely no knowledge of the pendency 
of the Proceeding. 
Finally, in all three cases it was clear that the defendants bore some fault for failure 
to respond or participate in the litigation. This Court and the Supreme Court made it clear 
in all three cases that fault on the part of the defendants themselves was a prerequisite to 
burdening them with the consequences of the negligence of their counsel. The courts did 
not enunciate a simple blanket rule that clients are responsible for the neglect of their 
attorneys, absent some fault of their own. In the present case, however, as clearly set 
forth in the record, Mr. Black should bear no fault for failing to respond to a proceeding 
of which he was completely unaware. 
The present case stands in stark contrast to those cases where the Utah courts have 
held that a client must bear the burden of his counsel's neglect. The Commission's 
misapplication and erroneous interpretation of the law is this: The Commission relied 
upon the three seminal cases on this issue as setting forth some blanket principle that the 
client must always bear the burden of counsel's neglect. The Commission failed to 
analyze these three cases and uncover that in all of them, the defendant bore some 
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responsibility for the failings. That is not the case, however, in Mr. Black's situation. He 
bore no fault for failing to respond to the Complaint and as such, that failure is excusable 
under Rule 60(b)(1). The Commission therefore erred in failing to set aside the Default 
and Default Judgment on this basis. 
Thus, because Mr. Black had no "fault," the principle established by these cases is 
not applicable in the present case. Given that Mr. Black was not at "fault," the present 
case is more closely aligned with one from the Fourth Circuit. In Augusta Fiberglass 
Coatings v. Fodor Contracting. 843 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1988), the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that in the context of setting aside defaults and default judgments, clients 
are generally relieved ofthe consequences of their counsel's mistakes. There, counsel for 
the defendant failed to answer the plaintiffs amended complaint because of his erroneous 
assumption that the parties were still in negotiation mode. Upon counsel's failure to file 
an answer, the plaintiff obtained entry of a default judgment. The district court refused to 
set aside the judgment and failed to distinguish between the failure or neglect of 
defendant's counsel and any neglect ofthe defendant itself. 
In reversing, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that there is, indeed, a "clear line 
between the fault of counsel and the fault of a party personally...." Where the default is 
entered solely because ofthe fault ofthe attorney, the party should not be saddled with 
that burden. As the court notes: "'justice demands that a blameless party not be 
disadvantaged by the errors or neglect of his attorney.'" IdL at 811 (quoting United States 
v. MoradL 673 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1982)). The court goes on to explain: "The focus on 
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the source of the default represents an equitable balance between our preference for trials 
on the merits and the judicial system's need for finality and efficiency in litigation." IcL 
As to the balance between those two competing interests, especially when the default is 
caused by counsel's neglect, the court held that *cWhen the party is blameless and the 
attorney is at fault, the former interests control and a default judgment should ordinarily 
be set aside." id. 
2. There is no Clear Evidence in the Record of an Agency 
Relationship Between Mr. Black and Mr. Diumenti. 
Similarly, as stated in Walker, an attorney's negligence may be imputed to his 
client on the principles of agency. In the present case, however, the record does not 
clearly establish that an attorney-client relationship or agency relationship existed 
between Mr. Black and Mr. Diumenti as to Mr. Black, personally. In arriving at its 
conclusion, the Commission points to Mr. Black's affidavit testimony (set forth in the 
Statement of Facts) that Mr. Black met with Mr. Diumenti to discuss issues regarding the 
sale of Black's Title and that Mr. Black ''relied upon Mr. Diumenti" to make responses on 
his behalf These two statements, however, do not clearly reflect that Mr. Diumenti was 
retained b\ Mr. Black, personally, to represent him in the Proceeding. Significantly, 
Mr. Black's affidavit goes on to state that "he knew of no such proceeding." Further, his 
consultation with Mr. Diumenti was regarding issues that involved the sale of Black's 
Title, not issues that concerned representation of Mr. Black personally. Thus, it is not 
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clear from the record that Mr. Diumenti represented Mr. Black personally in any context, 
let alone the Proceeding. 
In fact, the Insurance Department even recognizes that there is no evidence in the 
record that Mr. Diumenti represented Mr. Black. On page 2 of its Supplemental 
Memorandum in opposition to the Motion, the Insurance Department argues that 
Mr. Black and Kathi Black are not entitled to rely on Mr. Diumenti5s actions in the 
Proceeding because there is no evidence or affidavit from Mr. Diumenti ''regarding his 
retention or the extent of his representation in this matter." Thus, the Insurance 
Department agrees that the relationship is so vague that the Commission erred in 
imputing an agency relationship between Mr. Diumenti and Mr. Black. 
Obviously, the policy behind imputing an attorney's neglect to his client is that any 
damages suffered by the client may then be claimed against the attorney in a subsequent 
malpractice action. In the present case, however, there is not enough evidence in the 
record to indicate that Mr. Black would even be able to sustain such a cause of action 
against Mr. Diumenti, based on the ambiguity of the true nature of their relationship. 
C. In The Alternative. If The Facts Of This Case Do Not Fit Squarely Within 
Rule 60(b)(1). Then Thev Certainly Justify Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6). 
Subsection (6) of Rule 60(b) provides that a court may set aside a judgment for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Generally, 
subsection (6) is mutually exclusive from subsections 1 through 5. Courts generally hold 
that if the facts relied upon in a motion under Rule 60(b) even raise issues within 
-22-
subsections 1 through 55 then reliance upon subsection 6 constitutes an inappropriate 
circumvention of the other five subsections. Courts are generally concerned with 
preventing attempts to use subsection 6 to circumvent the strict time limits of subsections 
1 through 3. See, e.g., Laub v. South Cent. Utah Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). 
In light of the record in the present case, however, this general principle does not 
apply. It is true that the arguments in the previous sections focus on the fact that Mr. 
Black's failure to respond to the Complaint was due to excusable neglect based on the 
fact that he never received the Complaint and that his medical condition prevented him 
from attending to that a^  well as other duties. Because of Mr. Black's complete ignorance 
of the pendency of the Proceeding, however, his failure to respond or participate does not 
even rise to the level of neglect -- excusable or otherwise. Instead of the cases relied 
upon by the Commission, this case is much closer to two cases in which the United States 
Supreme Court, interpreting the identical federal version of Rule 60(b) granted relief to 
the defendants under subsection (6) because their failings did not even constitute 
"neglect." See Klapprott v. United States. 335 U.S. 601, 69 S. Ct. 384 (1949), as 
modified in 366 U.S. 942.; Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 
108 S. Ct. 2194 (1988). 
In Klapprott. a default denaturalization judgment was entered against 
Mr. Klapprott for his failure to appear. In his motion to set aside that judgment, 
Mr. Klapprott explained that at the time of the proceeding, he was sick, poor, and was in 
prison on related criminal charges only a few months after the complaint was served on 
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him. He was therefore unable to appear and defend himself in the civil denaturalization 
proceeding. Default judgment was entered in 1942. Upon release from prison in 1946, 
Mr. Klapprott requested relief under Rule 60(b) from the default judgment. 
In granting relief from the judgment, the Supreme Court stated: 
Petitioner's allegations set up an extraordinary situation which cannot fairly 
or logically be classified as mere "neglect" on his part. . . . The basis of his 
petition was not that he had neglected to act in his own defense, but that in 
jail as he was, weakened with illness, without a lawyer in the 
denaturalization proceedings or funds to hire one, disturbed and fully 
occupied in efforts to protect himself against the gravest criminal charges, 
he was no more able to defend himself in the New Jersey court than he 
would have been if he had never received notice of the charges. 
355 U.S. at 604. 
Similarly, in Liljeberg; the Supreme Court relied upon subsection (6) of Rule 60(b) 
to vacate a previously entered judgment. In that case, the moving party requested relief 
from a judgment after discovering that the trial judge should have recused himself 
because he was a trustee of a university that had an interest in the litigation. 
The Supreme Court, in analyzing Rule 60(b) again concluded that subsection 6 is 
mutually exclusive from subsections 1 through 5. However, where the case does not 
involve neglect or lack of due diligence on the part of the parties, the movant may rely 
upon subsection 6 as long as there are "extraordinary circumstances." The Supreme 
Court determined that the judge should have, indeed, disqualified himself and his failure 
to do so was a violation of the appellant's due process rights. However, there was no 
neglect on behalf of the parties or their counsel by not moving for disqualification sooner. 
-24-
There was no way the parties or counsel could have known of the conflict even if they 
had tried to discover it. Significantly, the Supreme Court not only held that subsection 
(6) should only be applied in "extraordinary circumstances," but that it also is a great 
reservoir of equitable power, granting courts broad authority to relieve a party from 
judgment "upon terms as are just." Ick at 863. What constitutes "extraordinary 
circumstances" is obviously a case by case determination. 
The present case is similar to the facts set forth in Klapprott and Liljeberg. The 
record clearly shows that Mr. Black was unaware of the pendency of the Proceeding 
against him. He did not physically receive any notification of the pendency of the 
Proceeding. Mr. Diumenti may have known about the Proceeding, but there is no 
evidence in the record that he did know or that he passed that knowledge along to 
Mr. Black. As such, Mr. Black's failure to participate in the Proceeding did not even 
"rise to the level of neglect." Neglect implies breach of a duty of care, and it is 
impossible to impose that duty on Mr. Black because he never was aware of the 
Proceeding. As such, Mr. Black's circumstances are similar to those of Mr. Klapprott, 
who, while he was away of the pendency of the proceeding, was prevented by 
participating by his incarceration. The Supreme Court determined that impossibility of 
participation is not neglect. Likewise, Mr. Black's impossibility of participation through 
lack of knowledge would not rise to the level of neglect — excusable or otherwise. 
In addition, other reasons exist that justify relief from the Default and Default 
Judgment under 60(b)(6), which reasons have nothing to do with neglect, mistake, or any 
-25-
of the other reasons set forth in subsections 1 through 5 of Rule 60(b). The following 
sections explain the reasons why relief is just. 
1. The Insurance Department Improperly Sought Default and Default 
Judgment without Giving Notice of its Intent to do so. 
Where local custom dictates that plaintiffs give notice of their intent to enter 
default, particularly where counsel for the plaintiff has been in contact with an attorney 
representing the defendant, the lack of such notice—formal or informal—is a basis for 
setting aside a default judgment. 
While the Utah appellate courts have not dealt with this issue, courts from other 
jurisdictions have. For example, in Ruggiero v. Phillips, 378 A.2d 971 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1977), and Mover v. Americana Mobile Homes, Inc.. 368 A.2d 80 •-: (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976), 
the plaintiffs obtained default judgments without advising the attorneys for the defendants 
of their intent to do so. In Ruggiero. plaintiffs counsel had negotiated with defendant's 
counsel prior to filing the complaint. However, the defendant obtained default judgment 
without notifying defendant's counsel. The Pennsylvania Superior Court stated as 
follows: 
Feeling as we do that "snap" judgments, taken without notice, do not serve 
the true purpose of a default judgment, we treat the giving of notice, or the 
foilure to do so, as an important factor in determining whether a default 
judgment should be opened. As we stated in Silverman . . . : 
One very frequent element in the sets of circumstances of 
cases where a default judgment has been upheld is notice to 
opposing counsel of the intent to enter default judgment. 
Conversely, the lack of such notice is frequently singled out 
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as an important factor justifying the opening of a default 
judgment. 
We conclude that a judgment taken on the first day that appellants were in 
default, without notice to their counsel, although such notice was customary 
in the community, should be opened if such relief is sought without undue 
delay. 
Ruggiero. 378 A.2d at 974. Likewise, in Mover, that same court stated: 
We note that plaintiffs attorney did not give appellant notice of his intent to 
take a default judgment. Although this is not required by the rules, we have 
previously noted that it is the preferred practice and a factor in considering 
a petition to open a default judgment. 
368 A.2d at 805, n.2. In both cases, the plaintiffs' failure to abide by this custom, born 
out of a desire for fairness and courtesy, was a factor weighed heavily by the court in 
vacating the default judgments. 
In the present case, the Insurance Department was apparently aware of Mr. 
Diumenti because it sent him a copy of the Complaint and the Notice. The record does 
not reflect, however, that the Department gave any type of notice to Mr. Diumenti—or 
anyone else, for that matter—of its intent to seek the entry of the Default and Default 
Judgment. Instead, like the plaintiffs in Ruggienx the Insurance Department sought what 
was truly a ''snap" judgment in the entry of the Default and Default Judgment: The thirty-
day response period expired on November 8, 1997—a Saturday; the next business day was 
Monday, November 10, 1997; two days later, on November 12, 1997, the Commission 
entered the Default and Default Judgment. While it is not required by rule or statute in 
this jurisdiction, it is customary for plaintiff to give notice of intent to enter default, 
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particularly where the plaintiff has had some contact with an attorney on the other side. 
Based on the holdings in Mover and Ruggiero, therefore, this Court should consider this 
factor heavily in reversing the Commission's Orders and vacating the Default and Default 
Judgment. 
2. New Evidence has Surfaced Since the Filing of the Motion. 
Between the date of the entry of the Commission's Order on Review and the filing 
of this brief, counsel for Mr. Black has learned of additional facts and evidence that 
would impact not only the determination of the Motion, but also the underlying facts and 
merits of the Commission's claims against Mr. Black in the Proceeding. For example, 
counsel for Mr. Black has learned that during the relevant time period during which the 
Commission's claims allegedly arose, Mr. Black's wife was purposefully keeping 
Mr. Black sedated so that he would be unaware of what she was doing at Black's Title. 
Mrs. Black has been charged criminally with matters relating to her activities at Black's 
Title. Mr. Black has obtained affidavits from a number of individuals who were aware of 
his having been drugged and is cooperating with the Davis County Attorney in the 
investigation of this matter. Mr. Black is prepared to make a full presentation of these 
facts if given the opportunity. 
i 
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3. The Default and Default Judgment Violate Mr. Black's Fundamental 
Due Process Rights. 
The fact that the Commission deprived Mr. Black of his insurance license without 
an awareness of the Proceeding was a violation of Mr. Black's Constitutional right to due 
process. It is a fundamental tenant of due process that a party must receive notice and a 
hearing before he can be deprived of a significant property interest. Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927). In the present case, the Default and Default 
Judgment deprive Mr. Black of his insurance license and his right and ability to earn a 
living. However, this substantial property right was taken in violation of Mr. Black's 
constitutional right to due process because the Default and Default Judgment were 
entered without any notice of the Proceeding. 
The Commission relies on the fact that notice of the Proceeding was sent by mail 
to Mr. Black's business address, as well as his home address in Davis County, pursuant to 
statutory authority. According to the statute, mailing is all that is required for the 
Department to effect service. The problem in this case is that Mr. Black never received 
that notice because his wife and staff were not delivering his mail, and he was too ill or 
otherwise incapacitated to do anything about it. Again, the fundamental tenant of due 
process is notice, which notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections." See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust. 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950). 
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In summary, while the Insurance Department may have statutory authority to 
complete service by mail, in this case the due process requirement of that statute was not 
satisfied because it did not put the defendant on notice of the Proceeding. To allow the 
Default and Default Judgment to stand against Mr. Black in light of the unrefuted 
evidence that he never received notice would be to place the form of the Insurance 
Department's authorization over the substance of basic due process. That would grant far 
too much power to the Commission, as an administrative agency. Again, it is important 
to note that Mr. Black is not seeking, at this point, an ultimate determination on the 
Insurance Department's claims. Mr. Black simply seeks to set aside the Default and 
Default Judgment in order to have the opportunit} to participate in the proceeding, put on 
his evidence, argue his position, and generally have an opportunity to fully and fairly 
litigate the issues rather than to simply suffer the entry of a default judgment in a 
proceeding of which he had no knowledge. 
111. ALL REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 60(b) ARE SATISFIED 
In addition to satisfying one of the subsections of Rule 60(b), a movant must also 
bring his or her motion in a timely fashion and must have meritorious defenses. In 
Mr. Black's Motion, he argued to the Commission that he satisfied both. The 
Commission did not dispute the timeliness of the Motion because it was brought within 
three months of the Default and Default Judgment. The Commission, however, simply 
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dismissed Mr. Black's argument that he had meritorious defenses, without rationale or 
basis. 
The Commission's disregard for Mr. Black's defenses is error. Together with his 
Motion, Mr. Black submitted a proposed Answer to the Complaint. In the Answer, he 
and the other respondents denied the key allegations of the Complaint, which denials, if 
proven, would defeat the Insurance Department's claims. These are sufficient for 
purposes of Rule 60(b). Again, Mr. Black does not seek ultimate determination of the 
claims at this point; he onl> seeks the opportunity to present these defenses and to deal 
with the Department's claims with evidence in a full, fair hearing, -n order to accomplish 
that, this Court must reverse the Commission's Orders that substantially prejudice 
Mr. Black, and vacate the Default and Default Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Black respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
Commission's Orders and vacate the Default and Default Judgment entered against him. 
DATED tty&t? day of November, 1998. 
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ADDENDUM A 
63-46b-13 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
a time period triggered by notice when the 
notice is served by mail, does not apply to 
extend the filing deadline, because under Sub-
section (l)(a) of this section the time for appeal 
runs from the issuance of an order, not from the 
service of an order on a party. Maverik Country 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-13, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 269; 1988, ch. 72, § 23. 
ANALYSIS 
Alternative procedures. 
—Reconsideration or appeal. 
Date order issued. 
Extension of time for request. 
Order granting or denying request. 
Cited. 
Alternative procedures. 
—Reconsideration or appeal. 
This section provides a petitioner with the 
option of applying to the agency for reconsid-
eration or appealing to the courts. It does not 
provide a petitioner the opportunity to pursue 
both routes concurrently. Maverik Country 
Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Date order issued. 
The disjunctive "or" in § 63-46b-14(3)(a) al-
lows a party to file a petition for judicial review 
within 30 days after the order constituting the 
Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Cited in Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 
1284 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
final agency action regardless of the "deemed 
denied'' date established by Subsection (3)(b) of 
this section. Knowledge Data Sys. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 865 P.2d 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Extension of time for request. 
When, after a final decision, the tax commis-
sion extended the time for requesting reconsid-
eration, the extension operated to extend the 
date on which the agency decision became "fi-
nal" by tolling the 30-day period for seeking 
judicial review. Harper Invs., Inc. v. Auditing 
Div., 868 P.2d 813 (Utah 1994). 
Order granting or denying request. 
Section 63-46b-10(l) requires considerable 
detail in agency orders issued in connection 
with formal adjudicative procedures; an am-
biguous letter, merely indicating that the re-
quest for reconsideration was unpersuasive, 
was not a ^written order" under Subsection (3) 
of this section. Lopez v. Career Serv. Review 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Energy, Natural Resources, Change Applications, 11 J. Energy, Nat. Re-
and Environmental Law. — Note, Bonham v. sources & Envtl. L. 143 (1990). 
Morgan: Utah's "New" Criteria for Water Right 
63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration. 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review 
by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is 
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency 
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the request is not 
a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one 
copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the person making the request. 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue 
a written order granting the request or denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does 
not issue an order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request 
for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Bd., 834 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
843 P2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
Even though petitioners chose not to file a 
petition for judicial review within the 20-day 
"deemed denied" period following a request for 
reconsideration, because the tax commission 
chose to consider the request for reconsidera-
tion and to act on it by issuing an order, the 
period for seeking review did not begin to run 
until the date of that final opinion, giving 
petitioners an additional 30 days to file for 
judicial review. Harper Invs., Inc. v. Auditing 
Div., 868 P.2d 813 (Utah 1994). 
Cited in 49th St. Galleria v. Tax Comm'n, 
860 P.2d 996 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Orton v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 864 P.2d 904 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
63-46b-14. Judicial review 
tive remedies. 
Exhaustion of administra-
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administra-
tive remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the require-
ment to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dis-
proportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency 
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties 
as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this 
chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-14, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 270; 1988, ch. 72, § 24. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Administrative review or rehearing. 
Commencement of filing period. 
Date order issued. 
Exhaustion of remedies. 
"Filing of petition" construed. 
Final appealable order. 
Review of excluded evidence. 
Review of tax commission order. 
Cited. 
Administrative review or rehearing. 
Homeowners association was statutorily re-
quired to first seek review or rehearing by the 
public service commission of its ruling in order 
to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
to review the issue of standby water fees, be-
cause the commission had not been properly 
afforded the opportunity to address the issue on 
the merits. Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 R2d 682 (Utah 1989). 
Commencement of filing period. 
The 30-day time period to file an appeal 
commences when the final agency order issues 
and not when received by a party. The period is 
not extended to allow for mailing time. Silva v. 
Department of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. 
Department of Emp. Sec, 844 P.2d 358 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993). 
Even though petitioners chose not to file a 
petition for judicial review within the 20-day 
"deemed denied" period following a request for 
reconsideration, because the tax commission 
chose to consider the request for reconsidera-
tion and to act on it by issuing an order, the 
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procity, where there had been no proceeding on future review. Archer v. Board of State Lands & 
his application that was sufficiently judicial in Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995). 
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing 
agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hear- Standard of review. 
ing.n Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Profes- The reviewing court applies differing stan-
sional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. dards of review to an agency's legal interpreta-
1991). tions: first, where the Legislature has explicitly 
This section requires that the district court's or implicitly delegated discretion to the agency 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings be to interpret or apply that law, an intermediate 
accomplished by holding a new trial, not just by deference standard of review is applied; second, 
reviewing an informal record; thus, the district where there is no explicit delegation of discre-
court erred in failing to conduct a trial de novo tion and the issues are questions of constitu-
of proceedings of the Department of Public
 t i o n a i i a w g ^ statutory construction, the court 
Safety relating to suspension of driving privi-
 r e v iews the agency's decision for correctness, 
leges. Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449
 E l k s L o d g e s N o s 7 1 9 & 2 0 2 1 v D epartment of 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189 
District court does not have discretion to (Utah 1995) 
review an informal adjudicative proceeding by 
any method other than a trial de novo; this rule Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
guarantees the district court the opportunity to v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 
correct any deficiencies that may arise because 233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah 
of the informal nature of administrative pro- State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct. 
ceedings and provides an adequate record for App. 1993). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by 
the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any 
statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
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(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-
making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demon-
strate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. 
Cross-References. — Review of procesd-
ANALYSIS 
Agency action. 
Applicability of section. 
Arbitrary action. 
Conflicting evidence. 
Exhaustion of remedies. 
Factual findings. 
Final order. 
Function of district court. 
Jurisdictional hearing by board. 
Prior practice. 
Review. 
Standard of review. 
—Interpretation of statute. 
—Questions of law. 
Substantial evidence test. 
Substantial prejudice. 
Whole record test. 
Cited. 
Agency action. 
Whether the industrial commission acted 
contrary to its own rule was governed by Sub-
section (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993), 
The tax commission's failure to detail how 
federal restraints on the use of subsidized prop-
erty should be assessed was not sufficient harm 
to the property owners to justify relief, when 
the only harm the owners alleged was that 
counties performing future assessments on 
subsidized housing would ignore the restraints. 
Alta Pac. Assocs. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
931 P2d 103 (Utah 1997). 
Applicability of section. 
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not 
ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction 
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610. 
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of 
deference an appellate court grants to an agen-
cy's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief 
should not be granted when, although the 
agency committed error, the error was harm-
less. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
The ground for relief provided by Subsection 
(4)(g) cannot be invoked to mount a facial 
challenge to an interpretive guideline used by 
an agency in its decision-making process. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 861 P.2d 414 (Utah 1993). 
Arb i t r a ry act ion. 
Industrial commission's denial of occupa-
tional disease disability benefits based upon a 
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of 
causation failed to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions 
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and there-
fore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v. 
Board of Review, 821 R2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Conflicting evidence. 
In undertaking a review, the appellate court 
will not substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though the 
court might have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before it for de novo review. 
It is the province of the board, not appellate 
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and 
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn 
from the same evidence, it is for the board to 
draw the inferences. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board 
of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Appellate court refers to the assessment by 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an 
appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are 
reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 273. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS mination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality. Johnson v. Department of Emp. 
Scope of review. Sec., 782 R2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Statutory interpretation. 
Scope of review. Statutory interpretation. 
The agency's factual findings will be upheld if The court does not defer to an agency's statu-
they are supported by substantial evidence tory interpretation unless the Legislature has 
when viewed in light of the whole record before explicitly, or implicitly, granted the agency dis-
the court. Johnson v. Department of Emp. Sec, cretion to interpret the statutory language at 
782 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). issue. Belnorth Petro. Corp. v. State Tax 
The agency's application of law to its factual Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
findings will not be disturbed unless its deter- denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other temporary 
remedies pending final disposition, 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the agency may grant a stay of its 
order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other temporary remedies 
unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested 
by a party, the agency's order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the 
public health, safety, or welfare against a substantial threat, the court may not 
grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it finds that: 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or 
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely to prevail on the merits 
when the court finally disposes of the matter; 
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will suffer irreparable injury 
withou^ immediate relief; 
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking review will not substan-
tially haniKpther parties to the proceedings; and 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the1 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a] 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998 
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion 
the following: "(4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action." This basis for a motion is not found 
in the federal rule. The committee concluded 
the clause was ambiguous and possibly in con-
flict with rules permitting service by means 
other than personal service. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment deleted the former fourth ground for a 
motion in Subdivision (b), as described in the 
Advisory Committee Note above, and renum-
bered the grounds accordingly. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.R 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
aAny other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
No claim for relief. 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
—Factual error. 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial court's discretion. 
—Unemployment compensation appeal. 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. 
—Notice to parties. 
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Reversal of judgment. 
— Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
ADDENDUM B 
BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMPLAINANT: 
UTAH STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
RESPONDENTS: 
BLACK'S TITLE, INC. 
License No. 02947, 
RONALD G. BLACK 
License No. 30047, and 
KATHI BLACK 
License No. 70421 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
Docket No. 1997-384-CE 
Black's Title. Inc., Ronald G. Black, and Kathi Black (also referred to as "Respondents") 
filed Requests for Agency Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 and the 
department's rule, R590-160-8 and requested a hearing on review. Section 63-46b-12(4) permits 
the department to conduct oral argument to assist in the review but does not require a hearing. 
Rule R590-10-8 also does not require a hearing but permits the reviewing person to accept oral 
argument at his or her discretion. Having reviewed the request and supporting memoranda and 
documents, the request for a hearing is denied because the record in the matter is sufficient for 
review in this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case began as an administrative proceeding before the Utah Insurance 
Commissioner. The Utah Insurance Department issued a Notice of Formal Adjudicative 
Proceeding and Pre-Hearing Conference on October 8, 1997. A pre-hearing conference was set 
for December 3, 1997. The notice included a copy of a complaint alleging that the Respondents 
had engaged in conduct which violated the Utah Insurance Code. The complaint demanded that 
a hearing be set in the matter; that a forfeiture be assessed; and that Respondents' licenses be 
revoked. The notice and the complaint were mailed by certified mail, postage prepaid to 
Respondents' business address in Bountiful, Utah. It was also mailed by first class mail, postage 
prepaid to Kathi and Ron Black's home address and to Respondents' counsel, Mr. George S. 
Dimmenti at his business address. The return receipts received by the department indicate that 
the documents were received at Respondents' business address. 
The department received no response to the notice and complaint and on November 12, 
1997 entered Respondents' default for failing to respond and revoked their licenses. The default 
and default judgment were mailed on the same day by regular mail, postage prepaid to 
Respondents' business address and to Respondents' attorney at his business address. 
On February 12, 1998 Respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Default and Default 
Judgment. Included with the motion was an Affidavit of Kathi Black and a Statement of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment. In the 
affidavit Mrs. Black said that she had delivered documents and mail relating to the department 
proceeding to Mr. Dimmenti and was made aware shortly after January 18, 1998 that no response 
had been made to the initial notice and cohiplaint and had assumed that the response had been 
made and that a hearing was to be set. Respondents, including Mr. Black, asked that the default 
and default judgment be overturned because of their mistake or inadvertence and legal counsel 
failed to make a written response. 
On February 17, 1998. the department filed its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Respondents' Motion to Set Aside Default opposing the motion. Ten days later, Ron Black 
appeared through separate counsel and filed a supplemental memorandum in support of the 
motion to set aside the default and default judgment. Attached thereto was his memorandum. 
During the last half of 1997 and since that time he has been under the care of a physician and was 
unable to work at Black's Title. Furthermore, during the same period of time he was only at the 
company only on a few occasions and only for a few minutes each time. He was aware that the 
company had legal problems with the department and understood that Mr. Dimmenti was 
representing them in the matter. He also met with Mr. Dimmenti to discuss the possible sale of 
the company to another title company. He was not aware that his license and the licenses of the 
company and his wife had been revoked until the Insurance Department began proceedings in 
Second District Court to enforce its default and default judgment. During the latter part of 1997, 
mail that was addressed to him was not given to him by employees at Black's Title or by his wife 
or by anyone else. According to Mr. Black he relied on Mr. Dimmenti to respond on his behalf 
and was never notified that he had any obligation to respond to the notice and complaint filed by 
the department in the matter. Apparently, Mr. Black has been living in Cache Valley and has not 
been informed of any matter relating to the business of Black's Title. 
It is in Mr. Black's memorandum that he asserts for the first time that he is relying on 
Rule 60(b)(1) and (7), Utah R. Civ. P. This conflicts with the motion previously filed on behalf 
of Mr. Black which relied only on Rule 60(b)(1). 
On April 16, 1998 the department issued its order denying the motion. On May 6, 1998 
Respondents Black's Title and Kathi Black filed a request for agency review of the denial order 
and Ron Black filed his request for agency review on May 8, 1998. Black's Title and Kathi 
Black rely on inadvertence or excusable neglect of all Respondents and their attorney as the 
ground for overturning the department's order. Ron Black asserts that the hearing officer's 
findings and conclusions were incorrect and therefore the order should be overturned. 
2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Should the order issued by the department's presiding officer be set aside because he 
made incorrect findings of fact and conclusions of law? 
DISCUSSION OF FACTS AND ISSUES 
This case turns on whether the presiding officer correctly applied Rule 60(b) to the facts 
of the case and whether he made incorrect findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Rule 60(b) permits a hearing officer to relieve a party from a final judgment, order or 
proceeding based on "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," Rule 60(b)(1). Utah 
R. Civ. P.. or "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment,'' Rule 
60(b)(7), Utah R. Civ. P. When the ground for relief falls within one of the other subparagraphs 
of Rule 60(b), the residuary clause, Rule 60(b)(7), can not be utilized for relief. Russell v. 
MartelL 681 P.2d 1193, 11*95 (Utah 1984). Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382, 
386-7 (Ct.App. 1991). Furthermore, a failure to act in a timely fashion is a ground under Rule 
60(b)(1) rather than under Rule 60(b)(7). Laub v. South Cent. UtahAss'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1308 
(Utah 1982). 
In determining whether justifiable excuse exists such factors as the conduct of the parties, 
the opportunity each has had to move the case forward and what they have done about it are 
appropriate factors to consider. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Co., 544 P.2d 
876. 878-9 (Utah 1975). To prevail on the basis of "mistake" or ''excusable neglect" a moving 
party must show that he or she has used due diligence and was prevented from acting by 
circumstances over which he or she had no control. Airkem Inter mountain, Inc., 513 P.2d 429. 
431 (Utah 1973). Neglect of an attorney is imputed to the client. Gardiner v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 
429 (Utah 1982). Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah App. 1987). 
In this case the evidence consists of affidavits of Kathi and Ron Black. Kathi Black's 
affidavit indicates, "I delivered documents and mail in the above-entitled matter to George S. 
Dimmenti, II, Esq., and was made aware shortly after January 18, 1998 that a written response 
should have been filed in this matter on or about November 9, 1997." She does not indicate 
when she delivered the documents to Mr. Dimmenti. She indicates that the documents were "in 
the above entitled matter". With the knowledge that the documents were "in the above entitled 
matter," she was under an obligation to diligently defend herself and Black's Title in the matter. 
She also was obligated to communicate with her attorney about the proceeding. Her affidavit 
indicates that she did neither. A complete indifference to an opportunity to defend is a proper 
basis to deny a motion under Rule 60(b)(1). Russell v. Mar tell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). 
A number of statements were made in the statements of fact in the memoranda filed by 
Kathi Black. However, many of the statements are not averred to in her affidavit and therefore 
are not a proper basis on which to make a finding of fact. 
j 
Ron Black claims to have no knowledge about the complaint and learned of the entry of 
the default and default judgment when the department filed an action to enforce the default 
judgment. His affidavit indicates that he knew that Black's Title and Kathi Black were under 
investigation by the department and that Kathi Black had retained George Dimmenti to represent 
Black's Title in the matter. His affidavit indicates that he had knowledge of "certain issues 
regarding Black's Title" and that the department was investigating them. Yet he did nothing to 
resolve them. He claims to be unable to work and is under the care of a physician but does not 
state the medical condition or reasons why he could not work or why it would prevent him from 
communicating with Mr. Dimmenti by telephone or in person. He offered no evidence from the 
physician. He claims that mail addressed to him at Black's Title was not given to him by the 
staff nor his wife. He does not state that it was being withheld, merely that it was not given to 
him. He also does not state that he attempted to get his mail and in spite of his requests it was 
not given to him. In spite of the fact that he was living in Cache Valley, he further states that he 
"reasonably relied on Mr. Dimmenti to attend to any legal requirements and to make such 
response as was necessary on my behalf." This demonstrates that he had knowledge that he 
needed to defend himself and he relied on his attorney to take care of it. Failure to keep in touch 
with his attorney and to diligently defend is again a proper basis on which to deny the motion. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Kathi Black had knowledge of the proceeding before the Insurance Commissioner. 
2. She turned her documents and mail relating to the proceeding over to her attorney and 
assumed that he had made responses on behalf of the Respondents. 
3. Neither She nor the other Respondents responded to the notice and complaint from the 
department. 
4. Kathi Black had an obligation and opportunity to make a response and did not do so. 
5. The failure of her attorney to file a timely response was in her control and is to be 
imputed to her and is not to be excused. 
6. Her actions constitute a failure to diligently defend and therefore her conduct and the 
failure of her attorney to respond on her behalf are not to be excused. 
7. Ron Black was aware that he needed to defend himself and the company. 
8. He relied on Mr. Dimmenti to respond on his behalf. 
9. He did not diligently act nor did he communicate with his counsel about the matter. 
10. The failure of his counsel to respond was in his control and he could have, through 
diligence and communication with counsel, ensured that a response was made. 
11. His actions constitute a failure to diligently defend and therefore his conduct and the 
failure of his attorney to respond on his behalf is not to be excused. 
12. The reasons asserted as grounds for overturning the department's order are in the 
nature of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect and therefore may not be used to justify 
overturning the order under Rule 60(b)(7), the residuary clause. 
4 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
Based on the above Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and a review of the record in 
the matter. Respondents" Requests for Agency Review are hereby denied. 
This order constitutes a final order of the Commissioner in the proceeding and any party 
aggrieved by the order may seek judicial review by filing a petition for judicial review with the 
appropriate appellate court within thirty days after the date the order is issued. 
Dated this y^fday of July, 1998. 
Neal T. Gooch 
Deputy Insurance Commissioner 
Designee of the Commissioner 
I hereby adopt the analysis, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the order of the 
designee as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Review of the 
commissioner in this matter. 
Merwin U. Stewart 
Utah Insurance Commissioner 
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Please take notice that, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46b-l 1, and more 
than 30 days having elapsed since the mailing of the Complaint and Notice of Formal 
Adjudicative Proceeding in this matter, and no response having been received, the Default of the 
Respondents is hereby entered. 
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DEFAULT ORDER 
The Default of the Respondents having previously been entered, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The insurance licenses of the Respondents, Black's Title, Inc., Ronald G. Black, and 
Kathi Black, are hereby revoked forthwith. 
DATED this / 2 # day of AJoot^l^ 1997. 
MERWIN U. STEWART 
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 
^jLfrVt 'A&AAA*. 
JOHN E. "MICKEY" BR^UN, Jr, CIE, CLU, ChFC 
Piteslding Officer 
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BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMPLAINANT: 
UTAH STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
RESPONDENT: 
BLACK'S TITLE, INC. 
License No. 02947 : 
RONALD G. BLACK : 
License No. 30047 : 
KATHI BLACK : 
License No. 70421 : 
: ORDER TO DENY MOTION TO SET 
: ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
: JUDGEMENT 
Docket No. 1997-384-CE 
FINDINGS 
Respondents, through their attorneys, made motion to set aside default and default 
judgement pursuant to Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.), Section 63-46b-l 1(3) and Utah 
Administrative Code (U.A.C.) Rules 55 and 60B. Section 63-46b-l 1(3) and Rule 55 deal with 
defaults, default judgement and the setting aside of these actions. The general preference for 
hearings on the merits does not arise unless the standards for setting aside default under Rule 
60(b) are met. In addition to the requirements for timely filing and for demonstration of a 
meritorious defense, Rule 60(b) establishes seven additional criteria for relief from judgement or 
order. Those criteria are 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 
(3) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon 
the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action; 
(5) the judgement is void; 
(6) the judgement has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgement upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgement should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgement. 
1 
Respondents' motions, complainant's opposition memorandums and cases cited by both 
parties were reviewed. Respondents' motions were timely, however, the motions present no 
defenses other than simple denials of the allegations in the complaint. No evidence is presented 
on which to determine if meritorious defenses to the allegations exist. 
Neither the respondents nor the cdmplainant allege that criteria 2 through 7 are applicable 
to the motions to set aside default and default judgement. Criteria 1 has four sub-criteria: 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Each of these sub-criteria are examined 
below. 
(1) Mistake. Respondents do not allege that mistakes were made *n the delivery of the 
complaint and notice of hearing to the respondents. Respondents allege that mistakes were made 
by their attorney, Mr. George S. Diumenti, II, however, respondents provided no statement from 
the attorney nor any other evidence to support the allegation that their attorney made mistakes in 
his handling of the complaint. 
(2) Inadvertence. Respondents do not allege that any inadvertence occurred. 
(3) Surprise. Respondents do not allege that any surprise occurred. 
(4) Excusable neglect. Respondent Ron Black alleges excusable neglect on his part 
because he was ill and not in the office when the complaint was received by Black's Title and 
because he was living in Cache Valley rather than at his home address when the complaint was 
received at his home address. U.A.C. Section R590-160-5(G)(3) directs the mailing of service to 
the business address on file with the Insurance Department. U.C.A. Section 31A-23-312(1) 
requires licensees to notify the commissioner, in writing, within 30 days of any change of 
address or telephone number. Ron Black's failure to avail himself of the opportunity to change 
his home address with the Department and his failure to keep himself informed of the activities 
of his business do not constitute excusable neglect. No evidence was presented by Ron Black to 
indicate that his illness was so incapacitating as to render him unable to effect a change of 
address with the Insurance Department or unable to keep himself apprised of the activities of his 
business. Respondent Kathi Black alleges excusable neglect on her part because she failed to 
open the complaint from the Department and her attorney, Mr. George S. Diumenti, II, failed to 
notify the respondents of the complaint and the requirements contained therein. Kathi Black's 
failure to open mail received by Black's Title and by her at her home address is not excusable 
neglect. Neither Kathi Black nor Black's Title provided a statement from Mr. Diumenti or 
presented any other evidence that Mr. Diumenti actions constituted excusable neglect. 
2 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The motion to set aside default and default judgement is denied. 
2. Respondents are reminded that pursuant to U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12 and U.A.C. 
Rule R590-160-8, respondents may request agency review of this order. Agency review must be 
requested within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of this order. 
DATED this / / / / day of / ? , / , / 1998. 
y
 7 
MERWIN U. STEWART 
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 
A ^ t — . 
E. "MICKEY" B#AUN, JR, CIE, CLU, ChFC 
of Utah Department of Insurance 
Office Building, Room 3110 
It Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone (801) 538-3800 
3 
Michael O. Leavttt 
Cuv«rnor 
Merwm L\ Stewart 
ComcQi*4ton*r 
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
State Office Building. Room 3110 
Salt Lake Cry. Utan 34114-6901 
^ S M 2 9 CERTIFICATE OF MATING 
www.ins-depl.siata.ut.us 
I do hereby certify that I mailed by regular mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the attached: 
ORDER TO DENY MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGEMENT 
Docket No. 1997-3 84-CE 
To the following: 
KIM R. WILSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & iVLARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11™ FLOOR 
P O BOX 4500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145 
MILO S. MARSDEN, JR. 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON, 
& BELL, LLC 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET, 5TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
DATED this 17th day of April 1998 
BLACK'S TITLE 
110 WEST CENTER STREET 
P O BOX 219 
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84011-0219 
KATHIBLACK 
675 NORTH 800 WEST 
WEST BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84087 
< & 
Dawn Alumbaugh, Insurance Technician 
Compliance and Enforcement Division 
Utah State Insurance Department 
State Office Building, Room 3110 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
